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Abstract: Recent highly publicized cases of scientific misconduct have raised concerns about its 
consequences for academic careers. Previous and anecdotal evidence suggests that these reach 
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show that the negative effects of scientific misconduct spill over to uninvolved prior 
collaborators: compared to a control group, prior collaborators of misconducting scientists, who 
have no link to the misconduct case, are cited 8 to 9% less afterwards. We suggest that the 
mechanism underlying this phenomenon is stigmatization by mere association. The result 
suggests that scientific misconduct generates large indirect costs in the form of mistrust against a 
wider range of research findings than was previously assumed. The broad fallout of misconduct 
implies that potential whistleblowers might be disinclined to make their concerns public in order 
to protect their own reputation and career.  
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1. Introduction 
Scientific misconduct affects many more than those who commit it. Consider for instance 
the case of the Center for Developmental Biology in Kobe, Japan, where in 2014 two retractions 
due to scientific misconduct led to a change in directors, half of its laboratories closing, merging, 
or moving elsewhere, and a budget slash of 40% (Cyranoski, 2015). In other cases, such as the one 
involving Dutch social psychologist Diederik Stapel, the work of graduate students was called into 
question due to the unethical actions of their supervisor.1  
The question arises how far the ripple effect of scientific misconduct reaches. Prior research 
has shown that co-authors of misconducting scientists experience significant drops in their 
publication flows (Mongeon and Larivière, 2014). While research on actual misconduct cases is 
scarce and due to the limited amount of cases rather descriptive (Lubalin and Matheson, 1999; 
Pozzi and David, 2007; Redman and Merz, 2008; Resnik and Dinse, 2012; Reynolds, 2004; 
Rhoades, 2004), we can refer to a related strand of the previous literature that has focused on 
retractions of journal articles. Retractions can occur in response to both scientific misconduct, but 
can also be due to honest mistakes (Azoulay et al., 2014a; Fang et al., 2012; Van Noorden, 2011). 
Despite the fact that a common cause of retraction is the honest reporting of a mistake by an author, 
retractions have been shown to have negative implications for the citations to prior and future work 
of the authors themselves (Azoulay et al., 2015, 2014a; Jin et al., 2013; Lu et al., 2013), articles 
conceptually related to the questionable science (Lu et al., 2013), and the narrowly defined 
research field as a whole (Azoulay et al., 2014a). 
                                                          
1 Cf. the report on Mr. Stapel’s fraudulent research (Levelt Committee et al., 2012): the work of many of the 
doctoral dissertations overseen by him needed to be reassessed since they were based on fraudulent data.  
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Here we show that the damage of scientific misconduct reaches further, affecting prior 
collaborators who collaborated in the past with a scientist found guilty of scientific misconduct, 
but who are not involved in the misconduct case. Our empirical analysis shows that prior 
collaborators face a citation penalty of 8 to 9% in the aftermath of a scientific misconduct case. 
We base this result on misconduct cases investigated by the U.S. Office of Research Integrity 
(ORI) between 1993 and 2008, which oversees misconduct investigations for research funded by 
the National Institute of Health (NIH) and the Public Health Service (PHS). Hence, our database 
is based on the complete list of investigated and well documented scientific misconduct cases at 
the world’s largest funder of medical research. 
This observation fits a theory of stigma spreading through mere association (Pontikes et 
al., 2010), where scientists are punished by the scientific community for being associated with a 
misconducting – and hence deviant from the norms – scientist. Crucially, they are punished for 
associating with scientists who afterwards turns out to have engaged in misconduct, but they did 
not choose to associate with a known fraudulent scientist. The effect we observe can be interpreted 
as an extended loss of trust in fellow scientists in the wake of misconduct. Trust plays an important 
role in science, considering its cumulative nature (Merton, 1973) and the lacking incentives and 
resources for replication of results (Hamermesh, 2007). While a loss of trust in the work of 
misconducting scientists can be seen as rational behaviour and as a means of self-regulation of the 
scientific community (Azoulay et al., 2015), it turns into wasteful ignorance of public knowledge 
if it spills over to others. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no solution to this problem. Transparency about 
guilt, a presumably obvious measure, apparently is a necessary but not sufficient precondition as 
the U.S. ORI already publishes detailed information about the investigated cases, including the 
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names of the scientists found guilty. This should help the community to distinguish fraudulent 
scientists from innocent bystanders, yet, we do not find innocent bystanders to emerge unscathed 
from a misconduct scandal. 
One important implication of our findings is that incentives for scientists to whistle blow 
on unethical behaviour of their collaborators are very low: scientists are unlikely to draw attention 
to foul play if they expect to be considered to be complicit by association. Such behaviour hinders 
the self-correction mechanism that science relies on. This implies that it is even more important to 
prevent misconduct at the bench, where it can be corrected without affecting the careers of others.  
We contribute to the previous literature in several ways. First, by drawing on the theory of 
social stigmatization (Goffman, 1963; Pontikes et al., 2010) we provide a general explanation for 
previously documented negative implications of scientific misconduct and retractions on closely 
related parties (Mongeon and Larivière, 2015) and the research field (Azoulay et al., 2014a). These 
articles employ three different mechanisms to describe their findings. The first one is Bayesian 
updating of beliefs (Azoulay et al., 2015, Jin et al., 2013), predicting that after the surfacing of 
retractions, involved scientists are considered to be of lower ‘quality’ than before. Second, a loss 
of trust may lead scientists to avoid citations to work associated with misconduct – even indirectly 
– in order to protect their integrity (Fuchs and Westervelt, 1996). Lastly, the actual or feared 
invalidation of part of the scientific field by a retraction may incentivize scientists to move to 
different topics (Azoulay et al., 2014a). The concept of stigmatization allows us to connect these 
different mechanisms. Caused by a loss of trust, social stigmatization can be the reason for a 
Bayesian updating of beliefs about the “quality” of prior collaborators and the means by which the 
members of the scientific community protect their own scientific integrity.  
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Second, our study focuses only on investigated cases of scientific misconduct in the field 
of medical research. Other than most of the previous studies that are based on retractions (Azoulay 
et al., 2015, 2014a; Jin et al., 2013; Lu et al., 2013; Mongeon and Larivière, 2015), we base our 
findings on an analysis of the Findings of Research Misconduct published by the ORI, the central 
U.S. authority that is responsible for investigating scientific misconduct cases in biomedical 
research funded by the NIH throughout the country, between 1993 and 2008. This data constitutes 
a complete list of cases of scientific misconduct committed by NIH grant recipients and grant 
recipients at the PHS investigated by the ORI. We thus avoid the considerable uncertainty inherent 
to retraction-based analyses and instead base ourselves on confirmed cases of scientific 
misconduct (Azoulay et al., 2014a; Fang et al., 2012; Van Noorden, 2011). In doing so, we expand 
the literature analysing misconduct at the ORI (Lubalin and Matheson, 1999; Pozzi and David, 
2007; Redman and Merz, 2008; Resnik and Dinse, 2012; Reynolds, 2004; Rhoades, 2004; Wright 
et al., 2008). 
Third, we contribute to understanding the consequences of misconduct on science by 
empirically showing that the implications of scientific misconduct spread beyond the scientists 
involved in the project and the fraudulent scientist’s institution. Specifically, our analysis shows 
that, misconduct scandals affect prior collaborators. Hence, the potential fallout of a misconduct 
scandal is much wider than one would assume.  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop our 
theoretical framework. Section three provides an overview on the institutional framework in the 
U.S. Section four details our methodology, before section 5 presents the data along with descriptive 
statistics. The results are presented in section six. Section seven concludes. 
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2. Conceptual framework 
This section describes the key features of the scientific system that help our understanding 
of the incentives for scientific misconduct. A second part draws from sociological research in order 
to introduce the concept of social stigmatization and apply it to the context of science and 
misconduct. 
2.1. Science and misconduct  
Trust is an important pillar of the scientific system (Dasgupta and David, 1994). This is 
due to its distinctive features, including the way in which scientists compete, the cumulative nature 
of science (Merton, 1973), and the freedom that scientists enjoy when choosing their projects 
(Stern, 2004, Aghion et al., 2008). 
Scientists compete in a race for priority, gaining reputation when they are first to publish 
new discoveries in scientific journals. The rewards for publishing include access to further 
resources, prestigious jobs offers, contacts to peers in science, as well as other lucrative 
opportunities inside and outside the academic sector (Merton, 1973). The race for priority is a 
winner-takes-all game: the second to finish wins (almost) nothing, even though her investment 
might have been large. This structure is beneficial for society as it sets incentives for scientists to 
disclose their discoveries as soon as possible, thus allowing follow-up research in a speedy manner 
and avoiding the duplication of research streams (Merton, 1957, Dasgupta and David, 1994, 
Stephan, 2012). The nature of scientific competition hence pushes scientific progress. The absence 
of formal intellectual property rights in the normal scientific process further accelerates the 
dissemination and adaption of scientific results. The fact that third parties can freely access, exploit 
and modify a published idea is well in lines with the scientists’ pursuit of maximizing reputation 
(Fleming and Sorenson, 2004; Murray and O’Mahony, 2007) 
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The downside of the winner-takes-all competition in science is that it creates incentives to 
cheat. As in sports, a laggard might find it beneficial to use forbidden means in order to increase 
the chances of winning a race. Classic game theory predicts that it can be a rational strategy to 
cheat in these settings, at least when the chances of being caught are relatively low (Nalebuff and 
Stiglitz, 1983). This seems to be the case in science because incentives for replication and other 
forms of double checking published results are low (Dewald et al., 1986; Hamermesh, 2007). Kiri 
et al. (2015) as well as Lacetera and Zirulia (2011) investigate the peer review system in a game 
theoretical setting. The predictions of their models include a certain positive equilibrium level of 
misconduct, and the worrisome observation that more stringent verification procedures do not 
necessarily lead to less misconduct.2 
In order to establish the importance of trust in science, two more features of the system of 
science production need to be understood. The first one is the well-known cumulative nature of 
science (Merton, 1973). Science evolves along specific lines of research where scientists use the 
prior insights of their colleagues as foundation and stepping stones for their own research (Azoulay 
et al., 2014a; Mokyr, 2002). The second distinct feature is that science also differs from alternative 
knowledge production systems insofar as scientists are enjoying substantial discretion in choosing 
                                                          
2 Lacetera and Zirulia (2011) consider four policy levers through which misconduct might be discouraged: 
facilitating replication studies, easing the “publish or perish” paradigm, increasing punishment for being caught, and 
involving journal editorials boards in checking for fraud. Although common knowledge dictates that increasing 
either should result in less fraud, they find that none of these policies is able to eliminate fraudulent behaviour and 
that some may in fact lead to more fraud. In their model, a reduction of costs for checking for fraud leads to a 
change in the degree of novelty of research that is conducted. Alleviating pressure to publish leads to more rather 
than to less fraud. Higher punishment for fraud can deter an author from cheating, but might also reduce incentives 
for checking. A more active role of the editorial board could crowd out incentives for the reader to check the 
published results. In a follow up paper, Kiri et al. (2015) focus explicitly on the interplay between investigating 
efforts in high quality research and efforts spend on validating research results produced by others. More validation 
leads to a higher research quality level, and low quality research can be eliminated if the incentives for verification 
and confirmatory research are high enough. However, a high number of scientists performing validation activities 
may reduce the overall level of validation activities as well as the overall quality level of research as the rewards 
need to be shared among many. Moreover, in research areas with a high level of collaboration, scientists may 
collude and not validate each others’ research findings if they have doubts. 
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their research projects (Aghion et al., 2008; Stern, 2004). As it is not possible to personally verify 
all prior research results related to a planned project, science depends in great degree on trust. It is 
thus only rational that scientists shy away from the results of authors that have been involved in 
retractions in the past (Azoulay et al., 2015, 2014a; Lu et al., 2013; Mongeon and Larivière, 2015).  
In line with this, it has been observed that scientists, eager to protect their reputation and 
wanting to avoid wasteful investments, avoid starting research projects in research areas 
characterized by a larger amount of retractions (Azoulay et al., 2014a; Lu et al., 2013). Closely 
related to our study, Azoulay et al. (2014a) investigate the impact of retractions  on cumulative 
science. They show that intelectually related articles receive fewer citations after a retraction 
occurs, with a stronger decline when the retraction is due to misconduct. Furthermore, scientists 
tend to avoid research fields in which retractions occur. While Azoulay et al. (2014a) are interested 
in the cumulativeness of research, employing retractions as a disruption to a research line, we are 
interested in the implications of scientific misconduct on prior collaborators of the fraudulent 
scientist investigating the role of trust in scientific communities.  
2.2. Stigma and mere association 
The fact that retractions spread beyond the scientists involved in the actual publication has 
been explained in the prior literature by rational Bayesian updating of beliefs (Azoulay et al., 2015; 
Jin et al., 2013), and the fear to start projects standing on “shaky shoulders” (Azoulay et al., 2014a). 
Since we are interested in the effect of misconduct on prior collaborators – who are more distant 
in time and in the sense that they are not directly involved in the fraud and are not necessarily 
thematically related to the fraudulent work - we draw in this section from sociology where the 
notion that bystanders suffer from being unjustifiably associated with others’ actions is well-
established, and finds expression in the concept of stigmatization (Goffman, 1963).  
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A stigma is defined as a perceived undesirable deeply discrediting attribute that disqualifies 
an individual from full social acceptance (Goffman, 1963). Attributes evoking a stigma can evolve 
along the attributes of an individual’s social identity which include physical appearance, 
professional activities and self-concept (Goffman, 1963). Stigmatization can hence be described 
in the general case as a flexible process involving labelling, stereotyping, separation, status loss 
and discrimination (Link and Phelan, 2001). Put into the context of the scientific community, 
individuals who commit scientific misconduct are likely to be stigmatized because they disrespect 
the norms of the scientific community. They are labelled to be cheaters, stereotyped into being 
generally untrustworthy, seen as different from the social norm of the scientist, and rejected by the 
scientific community through the ignoring of their findings and exclusion from common 
necessities such as scientific funding.  
Stigma can spread by virtue of association: an individual can be stigmatized purely because 
of an association, rather than because of discrediting attributes (Goldstein and Johnson, 1997; 
Mehta and Farina, 1988). ‘Stigma by association’ (Goldstein and Johnson, 1997) or ‘courtesy 
stigma’ (Goffman, 1963) or ‘associative stigma’ (Mehta and Farina, 1988) is well studied in 
laboratory settings (e.g. Goldstein & Johnson, 1997; Mehta & Farina, 1988; Neuberg, Smith, 
Hoffman, & Russell, 1994) and has been applied to a variety of different sources for stigmatization 
such as mental illness (e.g. Lefley, 1987), homosexuality (e.g. Swim et al., 1999), and criminal 
behaviour (e.g. Levenson and Tewksbury, 2009). It has also been observed in corporate settings 
through industry-wide implications of firm-specific scandals (Barnett and Hoffman, 2008; Barnett 
and King, 2008; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Smith et al., 2010) and wage losses of executives 
associated with firm wrongdoing (Groysberg et al., 2016).  
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Stigma transfers quickly: A single juxtaposition with a stigmatized individual can be 
enough to create further stereotyping (Risen et al., 2007). Stigma by association occurs for myriad 
reasons3 and is persistent. At its core, stigmatization by association is found to exist because of the 
assumption that individuals choose to associate with the stigmatized individual, thus justifying 
stereotyping of the associated individual (Pontikes et al., 2010). 
Essential to our setting is that stigmatization by association can occur ex post – an 
individual is stereotyped because he chooses to associate with the stigmatized group – or ex ante 
– an individual experiences stigmatization because of association with a group before it became 
stigmatized. The latter case is called stigma by mere association (Pontikes et al., 2010). Pontikes 
et al. (2010) show the existence of stigmatization by mere association among Hollywood actors in 
the times of the Red Scare: being merely associated with a blacklisted individual significantly 
reduced actors’ chances of being employed in feature films. The authors conclude that “stigma by 
association can lead to false positives and harm many innocents” (p.456). 
Our setting is one of mere association. Scientists do not expect their collaborators to engage 
in illicit behaviour. Yet, when a scandal surfaces they see part of their oeuvre tainted by the 
misconduct stigma. In the worst case, they are not complicit in producing a piece of false science 
and are stereotyped into fraudsters themselves. Empirical evidence supports this idea: co-authors 
of retracted studies see their citation rates drop (Jin et al., 2013; Mongeon and Larivière, 2015). In 
our case, the scientists of interest were not directly involved in false science. However, they can 
still be stigmatized because of stereotyping: the (original) misconducting author is classified as 
being a fraudster (even though evidence might exist for only one case of misconduct), which makes 
all of his collaborators, past, present and future, associated to fraud by mere association. This forms 
                                                          
3 An extreme example of arbitrary stigmatization is found in a study presenting lower expectations of job 
candidates that sit next to an obese female (Hebl and Mannix, 2003). 
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the main hypothesis of the paper: mere association with scientific misconduct, through prior 
collaboration, leads scientists to be caught in misconduct scandals. 
The question arises whether such behavior can be seen as rational. In our view, the answer 
is yes. As scientists need to resort to heuristics, including reputation, to assess the quality of the 
work of their colleagues (Merton, 1968, p.59), association to misconducting authors can be 
interpreted as a negative quality signal. Rational herding behavior (Banerjee, 1992) may add to 
this. If scientists see that peers shy away from a researcher’s prior work they may believe that these 
colleagues have more information about the honesty of the researcher in question and her 
involvement in the misconduct case.  
The next question is whether such behavior is welfare enhancing or destroying. Ignoring 
research results is welfare enhancing when they are invalid or “shaky” (Azoulay et al, 2014a). 
Ignoring valid research results is welfare destroying. We believe that the ignorance of research of 
prior collaborators of a fraudulent scientist is to a large extend welfare destroying, as they are not 
directly connected to fraudulent research, apart from an indirect association through prior 
collaboration, and incidental overlaps in topic. Neither of these, however, are informative of the 
quality of the ignored research.   
3. Institutional Context 
The empirical analysis is based on Findings of Research Misconduct published by the 
Office of Research Integrity (ORI) in the U.S. Since 1993, the ORI has the responsibility to oversee 
and direct activities concerning matters of research integrity within the Public Health Services. 
This includes intramural and extramural scientific misconduct in research funded by the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) and other agencies of the PHS, but does not include activities concerning 
regulatory research integrity by the Food and Drug Administration.  
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When the ORI receives allegations of scientific misconduct, either directly or through the 
funding institutes, the ORI decides whether or not to pursue the allegation through an inquiry. Note 
that institutions can also pursue an inquiry independently. If grounds are found to continue, the 
inquiry becomes an ORI investigation. If evidence of scientific misconduct is found, the ORI 
publishes the results in its Findings of Research Misconduct, as well as in its annual report.4 These 
reports transparently and in great detail describe the misconduct case: the persons involved, where 
and when misconduct took place, the nature of the misconduct, any publications that are affected 
by it, and any administrative sanctions taken such as institutional oversight, exclusion from referee 
or advisory boards, exclusion from government contracting, and/or exclusion from further NIH or 
PHS funding. This level of transparency allows the identification of scientists found to be guilty 
of scientific misconduct.5 The ORI maintains the following definition of research misconduct: 
“Research misconduct means fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism in proposing, performing, or 
reviewing research, or in reporting research results. Fabrication is making up data or results and 
recording or reporting them. Falsification is manipulating research materials, equipment, or 
processes, or changing or omitting data or results such that the research is not accurately 
represented in the research record. Plagiarism is the appropriation of another person's ideas, 
processes, results or words without giving appropriate credit. Research misconduct does not 
include honest error or differences of opinion” (Office of Research Integrity, 2011).  
There are previous studies focusing on the ORI cases of scientific misconduct (Lubalin and 
Matheson, 1999; Pozzi and David, 2007; Redman and Merz, 2008; Resnik and Dinse, 2012; 
Reynolds, 2004; Rhoades, 2004; Wright et al., 2008). Earlier studies (Rhoades, 2004, Reynolds, 
                                                          
4 See http://ori.hhs.gov/historical-background. The first ORI annual report was published in 1994.  
5 A more detailed description of the ORI’s course of action in misconduct investigation and statistics on previous 
investigations can be found in Roades (2004). 
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2004, Pozzi and David, 2007) provide detailed descriptive evidence on the ORI misconduct cases, 
looking into the different types of accusations and outcomes, sources of funding, trends over time, 
etc. Resnik and Dinse (2012) investigate the correlation between information provided by the 
journal retraction note and the outcome of the ORI investigation. Redman and Merz (2008) 
consider the career consequences of being found guilty by the ORI, finding that being found guilty 
of misconduct by the ORI associates with severe drops in publication rates (with approximately a 
third dropping out of publishing completely), and a high incidence of leaving university 
employment. Lubalin and Matheson (1999) survey whistle blowers and individuals accused of 
having been involved in scientific misconduct but exonerated, investigating long-run and short-
run professional and personal consequences for both groups. They find that in the short-run, during 
the period of investigation, whistleblowers fare worse than those accused of misconduct. While 
both groups report little long-term impacts, those accused of misconduct report worse 
consequences in terms of mental and physical health as well as self-esteem and self-identity. 
Lastly, Wright et al. (2008) point out that the majority of misconduct cases is associated with a 
lack of oversight by mentors. In more than half of the investigated cases, stress was reported as a 
main or contributing factor to misconduct. 
4. Method 
We aim at investigating how scientific misconduct affects the reputation of prior 
collaborators, as proxied through the accumulation of citations. Citations to publications are a 
widely used indicator for the importance of scientists and their scientific findings, reflecting to 
which extent results and insights are used as building stones for future research. They have been 
shown to correlate with other measures of a scientist’s influence such as awards, honours and 
Nobel laureateships (Cole and Cole, 1967; Inhaber and Przednowek, 2007; Myers, 1970) as well 
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as with peer judgements (Aksnes and Taxt, 2004). Keeping the quality of the scientist and other 
factors constant, a drop in citations reflects a loss of trust in the scientists’ work by the scientific 
community. We start the analysis with a descriptive exercise to detect a change in the time trend 
of the citations received by an innocent prior collaborator. This shows whether a drop in citations 
occurs around the point in time when the misconduct case was published. Since a so-detected dip 
in the trend could be driven by time-varying macro effects we employ a control group of 
comparable scientists that were not associated to a misconduct case. These scientists serve as a 
benchmark, a control group, and allow us to abstract from influences other than the publication 
of the misconduct case that could impact the citations that the publications of a researcher that 
was collaborating with a misconducting scientist, the treatment group, receive. 
To evaluate whether there is a causal effect of the publication of a misconduct case on the 
citations to prior collaborators, we employ a difference-in-difference method that allows us to 
compare the evolution of citations to prior collaborators of misconducting scientists relative to 
citations to the control group of scientists. We control for scientist career age and unobservable 
ability in a multivariate setting. More specifically, we estimate an equation of the form: 
Citationsit = ψ1Tt + ψ2Pti + ψ3Ti ∗ Ptt +  βΓi + φt + 𝜉𝑖 + ln (𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡) + εit 
Where Citationsit represents the total number of citations accumulated by articles 
published by author 𝑖 in year 𝑡 by the time the data were collected. In the remainder of the 
analysis, we refer to this measure as ‘aggregate citations’.6 As citation counts follow a count 
                                                          
6 The data were collected in late 2014. As we only consider misconduct cases up to 2008, this leaves reasonable time 
for citations to accumulate, even three years after the Findings have been published. We control for any remaining 
time-driven variation in citations through a set of publication year dummies. We additionally show the robustness of 
our results to employing a citation flow indicator, representing the number of citations an author received in a year 
regardless of the year in which the cited article was published. 
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distribution, we estimate a Poisson model. We offset aggregate citations by publication output by 
including the natural logarithm of the number of publications issued by the author in the year, 
with coefficient constrained to one, to account for differences in publication output. 
Tt and Pti represent the core of the model. The first variable is an indicator variable that 
takes the value one if the author is in the treatment group, and zero otherwise. The second 
variable takes value zero in pre-treatment years, and one after treatment. The estimated 
coefficients of these variables, ψ1 and ψ2, thus capture any systematic differences in aggregate 
citations between the treatment and control group, and between any shared differences pre- and 
post-treatment. The main result of the model is provided by ψ3, which captures the average 
difference in change of aggregate citations between control and treatment observations after the 
misconduct was discovered. If scientists in the treatment group experience a drop in aggregate 
citation after being associated with scientific misconduct, while scientists in the control group do 
not, ψ3 takes a negative and significant coefficient. 
Γi represents a vector of individual-specific factors that affect citations. One such factor is 
career age, as measured by the time since the authors’ first publication in a scientific journal. 
This accounts for the fact that authors have changing levels of commitment to publishing as their 
career progresses (e.g. Stephan and Levin, 1992). We include career age in linear and squared 
terms to account for possible life time effect of scientific productivity of researchers.  
Another factor is talent, or ability. As this is usually impossible to observe directly by the 
econometrician, we control for inherent differences in citation rates either through unobserved 
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(fixed) effects models or by applying a pre-sample average estimator (Blundell et al., 1999).7 
Finally, φt captures common time trends through a set of year dummies, and 𝜉𝑖 captures that 
misconduct can have a quite heterogeneous impact through a set of case dummies.  
5. Data  
5.1. Data sources and construction of the database 
The analysis is based on the Findings of Research Misconduct as published by the Office 
of Research Integrity (ORI). The Findings are concerned with misconduct cases of National 
Institute of Health (NIH) grant recipients and grant recipients at the Public Health Service (PHS). 
The analysis makes use of the 36 cases published between 1993 and 2008 in which at least one 
scientific publication with a Pubmed8 identifier was affected. We focus on misconduct cases 
involving retractions or corrections only9 in order to restrict the analysis on misconduct with real 
scientific impact.  
We should note that research funded by the NIH or PHS is not representative of all 
research performed in biomedicine: given the eminence associated with being NIH-funded, we 
expect misconduct cases investigated by the ORI to be more high-profile than the average 
misconduct case. This is corroborated by the fact that these misconduct cases involve significant 
sanctions, barring researchers temporarily or permanently from NIH funding, contracting with 
the PHS, or subjecting them to institutional oversight  (Redman and Merz, 2008). Given that the 
                                                          
7 The pre-sample mean estimator suggested by Blundell et al. (1999) accounts for unaccounted heterogeneity due to 
unobservables by including an additional parameter in the model which contains the pre-sample average outcome. 
This restrains our models to prior collaborators whose publication outputs has been observed for at least four year at 
the time the Findings were published. 
8 Pubmed is a search engine for the bibliometric database MEDLINE (Medical Literature Ananlysis and Retrieval 
System Online). This database covers more than 5,500 biomedical journals.   
9 Others include faking of credentials, of affiliations, and fraud in applications, often occuring in the application 
phase for an NIH grant. 
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NIH accounts for a substantial share of biomedical research funding in the U.S., 28% in 2008 
(Dorsey et al., 2010), and that grant recipients constitute top researchers, it is a relevant setting to 
study nevertheless.  
We retrieved all of the misconducting author’s publications and citations from the Scopus 
publication database in late 2014. Through these publications we identified prior collaborators of 
the misconducting authors in the five years prior to the publication of the case in the Findings. 
Throughout the analysis, we take articles, conference papers, notes, reviews, and short surveys 
into account. Letters, books, and other document types are not taken into consideration. 
Our dependent variable is the aggregate number of citations that the articles published in 
the focal year receive over the years until late 2014 when the data was collected. As we only 
consider misconduct cases up to 2008, this leaves reasonable time for citations to accumulate, 
even three years after the Findings have been published. In the robustness check section, we also 
use the annual citation flow as an alternative dependent variable. This data is available from 
Scopus from 1996 onwards only. 
Authors who also collaborated on work mentioned in the Findings were excluded from 
the set of collaborators to ensure that the effects found only stem from association, and not direct 
implication. We also removed all articles co-authored with the misconducting scientist, as 
citations to these articles could be affected by negative attention directed to the misconducting 
author. Furthermore, we removed authors who were co-authors of more than one misconducting 
scientist, as these are subject to multiple treatments. After data cleaning we arrived at 929 unique 
co-authors that published with the misconducting scientists in the five years prior to the 
publication of the Findings. Our final sample is somewhat smaller, consisting of 856 treated co-
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authors as we need to observe publication outputs at least four years before the misconduct was 
published in order to be able to apply a pre-sample correction for unobserved ability.  
5.2. Construction of control group 
To construct a control group we need to identify prior collaborators comparable to the 
treated prior collaborators, i.e. those that collaborated with a fraudulent NIH or PSH grant 
recipient in the past. We achieve this by selecting prior collaborators of a scientist funded by a 
similar grant of the same agency as the misconducting scientist. Selection based on grant receipt 
is essential since we observe a positive selection when focusing on scientists that receive grants. 
To do this, we used the NIH grant database made available by Pierre Azoulay, and is referred to 
as Grant2pmid database.10 This database covers NIH grants since 1971, and lists grant numbers, 
general information about the grant, and any publications (indexed by Pubmed identification 
numbers) which list the grant as source of funding.  
The control group was built as follows. We selected a NIH grant which was listed as 
funding on the corrected or retracted publication mentioned in the Findings (‘treatment grant’). 
We then match a control grant (using the NIH grant database) with similar characteristics in 
terms of medical research area, type of grant, grant year, and grant duration as the treatment 
grant (‘control grant’). We match on research area by selecting grants issued by the same NIH 
institute. The National Institutes of Health consist of 27 institutes and centers, which are divided 
thematically. Thus, grants issued by a center should be in comparable fields. Examples of 
institutes are the National Cancer Institute (NCI), the National Human Genome Research 
Institute (NHGRI), and the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases 
                                                          
10 http://pazoulay.scripts.mit.edu/Data.html 
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(NIDDK). Selecting the grant of a similar type ensures that the grantees are in a comparable 
career position. While the database does not include information on the size of the grant, we 
proxy for this through the duration of the grant.  
We then selected a random author of a random publication supported by the control grant 
to serve as a match for the misconducting grant recipient and used Scopus to identify this 
author’s prior collaborators in the five years before the Findings associated with the corrected or 
retracted publication were published. This results in a final control group of 1,149 co-authors. 
The process is summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary of Data Gathering Protocol 
1. For each misconduct case, select a NIH grant acknowledging funding of one of the papers 
listed as affected in the Findings  
x Pick the grant on the earliest paper listed in the Findings which acknowledges 
funding 
x Pick the earliest grant in case the paper acknowledges more than one NIH grant 
2. Match the so retrieved ‘treatment’ NIH grants to  NIH ‘control’ grants with similar 
characteristics as the treatment grants, considering granting institute, grant type, grant 
duration, and grant year as matching parameters. 
3. For each control grant, select one publication funded by it 
x In case more than one paper was supported by the control grant, the publication 
published as closely as possible to the treatment publication was chosen. 
4. Select a random author of these publications to form the control group of the misconducting 
authors 
5. Collect the collaborators of the control authors in the five years before the relevant 
Findings were published. 
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6. Results 
 
6.1. Visual Inspection 
To start with a visual description of the effect of the publication of the Findings on prior 
collaborators compared to control authors, we estimate the evolution of the aggregate citations 
over time. To do so, we estimate a Poisson model on the author-year level interacting the 
treatment indicator with each year relative to the publication of the Findings, controlling for 
calendar year and case effects. We further control for the number of articles published in the 
year. The resulting coefficients of the interaction terms thus represent the difference between 
treatment and control collaborators over time. 
Figure 1 plots the effects and 95% confidence intervals. Three and two years before the 
misconduct is revealed, there is no significant difference in aggregate citations between the 
articles published by treatment and control authors, confirming that the control authors are 
similar to the treatment authors in that time period. In the year before the misconduct is revealed, 
aggregate citations drop to 86% compared to those of control authors, and hover around this 
proportion until t+3. 
The fact that the aggregate citations start decreasing in t-1, i.e. before the scientific 
misconduct case is published, is likely explained by the presence of rumours of misconduct 
during the investigation: we take the end of the investigation, the publication of the Findings, as 
treatment, but reputational damage could occur much earlier. The ORI’s investigation takes on 
average approximately half a year to complete, and rumours of potential  misconduct could 
spread throughout the scientific community even before allegations reach the ORI (Rhoades, 
2004). The dip in t-1 is likely to be further deepened by the fact that we plot aggregate citations 
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and not the flow of citations in t: articles published just before the misconduct case was revealed 
could still be affected, as a large part of their citations would only emerge after the Findings have 
been published. 
Figure 1: Average aggregate citations to prior collaborators’ publications relative to the 
control group  
 
Note: This figure represents a plot of coefficients stemming from a Poisson model where prior collaborator’s aggregate 
citations are regressed onto year and case effects, an exposure term capturing publication output in the year, and 7 
interaction terms which represent the treatment effect for each year before or after the Findings were published. 
Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Incidence Rate Ratios. Confidence bands represent 95% confidence 
intervals, calculated based on robust standard errors clustered by misconduct case.  
6.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides summary statistics and correlations. The average prior collaborator of a 
grant recipient in the sample publishes 4.39 papers per year, which received 282.23 aggregate 
citations. The average prior collaborator enters the sample relatively late in her career, 16.94 
years after their first publication. It should be underscored here that the sample under study does 
not form a representative sample of biomedical researchers, but rather of researchers that 
collaborate with recipients of prestigious NIH grants. 
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Table 3 compares the means between the treatment and control groups for the key 
variables. Treated prior collaborators publish slightly more than those in the control group 
(treated: 4.75, control 4.11 difference significant at p<0.01), but the control scientists are cited 
equally often (treatment: 274 aggregate citations per year, control: 288, difference not significant 
at p<0.1). In terms of control variables, treated authors are approximately half a year younger 
than control authors (treatment: 16.62 years since first publication, control: 17.18, significant at 
p<0.01) and tend to have lower measures of pre-sample citations average per publication 
(treatment: 41.92, control: 50.78, significant at p<0.01), which are defined as the average 
aggregate citations per publication the author received in each observed year before t-3. 
Table 2: Summary statistics (2005 prior collaborators, 13206 observations) 
 Summary Statistics  Correlation Matrix 
 Mean St. Dev Min Median Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Publications 4.39 6.12 0 2 121 1      
2. Aggregate Citations 282.23 492.21 0 91 4257 0.69 1     
3. Years since first publication 16.94 9.43 1 16 56 0.22 0.17 1    
4. Pre-sample aggregate citations 
per publication average 
46.91 62.17 0 30.71 1046.5 
0.03 0.15 -0.13 1   
5. Treatment dummy 0.44 0.5 0 0 1 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 1  
6. After treatment indicator 0.55 0.5 0 1 1 0.02 0.01 0.18 -0.01 0.02 1 
Note: 42 prior collaborators that did not publish between t-3 and t+3 have been dropped from the sample used for the descriptive 
statistics. Aggregate citations: total number of citations received by papers published in year t at time of data extraction. 
 
Table 3: Mean comparison treated and control samples 
 
 Treated  Control Diff 
 Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev  
Publications 4.75 7.08 4.11 5.23 *** 
Aggregate citations 274.31 473.09 288.37 506.48 . 
Years since first publication 16.62 9.48 17.18 9.48 *** 
Pre-sample aggregate citations per publication average 41.92 65.17 50.78 59.46 *** 
After treatment indicator 0.56 0.50 .054 0.50 ** 
Authors 856 1149  
Observations 5769 7437  
Notes: Sample restricted to author-years with at least one publication to match baseline estimation sample. Diff: two-sample t-
test. Stars indicate significance level of difference: *: p<0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p< 0.01 
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6.3. Estimation results 
Table 4 presents the results of Poisson regression of prior collaborator’s aggregate 
citations on the treatment effects and controls. In all specifications, we find that the aggregate 
citations per publication by treated prior collaborators drops compared to prior collaborators in 
the control group in the years after the Findings were published. The point estimates of all 
specifications are significant at least p < 0.05 and show an average drop between 8% and 9% in 
the main specifications and up to 12% in the alternate specifications. 
The first column shows the model without taking into account any observed or 
unobserved scientist-specific controls, only controlling for case and common year effects. The 
former is justified by the idea that cases of misconduct bring about highly heterogeneous 
amounts of (media) attention in the scientific community and severity. Therefore, the effect on 
the careers of prior collaborators is also likely to be partly case-specific. The results show that 
treated prior collaborators’ aggregate citations do not differ significantly from control 
collaborators. We also find positive trend for both groups, which is captured by the dummy 
indicating the after-treatment. The treatment effect of being a treated prior collaborator (as 
inferred from the interaction between being in the treated group and the after-treatment indicator) 
is negative and highly significant, with a marginal effect of 11.3% at the mean.11 In other words, 
prior collaborators suffer a loss of 11.3% in aggregate citations after a scandal is published. 
Model 1, however, does not control for publication volume. Therefore, we offset citation 
counts by publication counts in model 2.12 This controls for the volume of scientific output and 
                                                          
11 Calculated as the difference in expected incidence rate ratio at the mean, i.e. 1-exp(-0.12).  
12 In practice, we include the natural logarithm of the number of publications in year t as an explanatory variable 
with its coefficient fixed at one. This thus means that we have to condition on the subsample with at least one 
publication per year, which is the case for 80% of the sample. 
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allows us to interpret the coefficients as a change in citation rate. Offsetting changes the 
interpretation of the results: whereas treated prior collaborators gathered weakly significantly 
more citations than control prior collaborators, they gather fewer per publication. Offsetting also 
lowers the treatment effect: the drop of 11.3% of citations at the mean translates to a drop of 
7.7% in the citation to publication rate.   
In model 3 we enrich the offset baseline model by controlling for the career age of the 
scientist through the time since first publication in linear and quadratic form. We additionally 
include a proxy for unobserved ability in the form of the pre-sample average aggregate citations 
per publications. We find an inverted-U shaped relation between career age and citation counts, 
and a positive significant relationship between pre-sample citations per publications and current 
citation outputs. Including these factors slightly increases the treatment effect from 7.7% to 
8.6%. 
The results in columns 2 and 3 are based on the assumption that there is a one-to-one 
relationship between citations and publications. That is, the model assumes that the coefficient of 
the natural logarithm of publications is one. In model four, we relax this assumption. We find 
that the estimated treatment effect is the same as before, and the coefficient of the publication 
offset is highly significant (p<0.01) and estimated at 1.02. 
Figure 1 showed an initial drop in aggregate citations among treatment prior 
collaborators, as compared to prior collaborators in the control group, at t-1. We speculate that 
this can be a result of inaccuracy of the treatment effect: while we are certain that the misconduct 
has been published with the publication of the Findings, the misconduct could also have been 
made public through other channels before then. We test whether this concern explains our 
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findings through model 5, where we move the treatment one year forward, to t-1. While the 
results are qualitatively the same, the treatment effect is estimated slightly higher at 11.3% in this 
specification. As an alternative robustness test, we provide results when disregarding years t-1 
and t0 in column 6. We thus compare the aggregate citations three and two years before the 
findings of misconduct to one to three years after. This shows an even higher estimate of the 
treatment effect at 12.2%.  
Lastly, we present in column 7 the results of fixed effects Poisson estimation with robust 
standard errors as described in Wooldridge (Wooldridge, 1999). Using fixed effects instead of 
pre-sample estimators does not yield different conclusions. As in model 2 and 3, the treatment 
effect is estimated at 8.6%.  
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6.4. Further analysis and robustness checks 
6.4.1. Effect on publication output 
Table 5 presents estimation results for Poisson regression models using the volume of 
scientific output as the dependent variable. The models presented in columns 1-3 do not show 
a statistically or economically significant drop in the number of papers published by the prior 
collaborators after the Findings were revealed. This strengthens the interpretation of the 
observed drop in citations being the result of stigmatization – lower perceived quality or 
reliability of published science, and not of effort exercised by the authors, in which case a 
drop in publications should also be observed.  
Table 5: Poisson regression estimates of publications by prior collaborators of 
misconducting authors  
 
Dependent: Prior collaborator’s 
publication count 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Model  Baseline Incl. Controls QML FE 
Treatment group 
 0.27*** 0.18***  
 (0.07) (0.05)  
After-treatment period 
 -0.02 0.003 -0.0005 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Treatment group* 
After-treatment period 
 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Years since first publication 
  0.07***  
  (0.01)  
Years since first publication2/100 
  -0.15***  
  (0.02)  
Pre-sample publication average 
  0.15***  
  (0.01)  
Intercept 
 0.80*** 0.07  
 (0.14) (0.18)  
Year effects  YES YES YES 
Case effects  YES YES NO 
Individual fixed effect  NO NO YES 
Number of observations  13206 13206 13204 
Notes: Poisson estimation of yearly publication counts of prior collaborators. Years since first publication²: 
coefficient scaled down for readability. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.  Stars indicate significance 
level of coefficient: *: p<0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p< 0.01 
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6.4.2. Effect on misconducting authors 
Table 6 shows the effects on misconducting authors themselves. The results (columns 
1-3) show a negative and weakly significant treatment effect in the range of 26 to 33%. 
Previous studies focusing on retractions which include scientific misconduct cases along with 
retractions due to honest mistakes identified a ‘career effect’ on the order of 10% (Azoulay et 
al., 2015). In comparison, we are analysing a dataset of investigated and declared misconduct 
cases of highly eminent researchers. Note also that the statistical significance of these 
coefficients is hindered by the much smaller estimation sample. 
Columns 4 to 6 show estimates of publication output by misconducting authors. In line 
with previous findings (Redman and Merz, 2008), authors found guilty of scientific 
misconduct by the ORI have a high chance of dropping out of publishing: 21% of authors do 
not publish in the three years after treatment, compared to 5% in the three years before. This 
is a stark increase compared to the control group, which only shows 3% non-publishing 
authors in the after-treatment period. This pattern is mimicked in the regression estimates, 
which report drops in publication output by misconducting authors between 36 and 44% 
(columns 4-6). However, this effect is only statistically significant in the fixed effects 
specification where we control for author-specific unobserved effects, indicating a strong 
degree of remaining unobserved heterogeneity.  
  
28 
 
 
Table 6: Poisson regression estimates of citations rates and publication output of 
misconducting authors  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
Misconducting author’s 
aggregate citations 
Misconducting author’s 
publications 
Model Baseline 
Incl.  
controls 
QML 
FE 
Baseline 
Incl.  
controls 
QML 
FE 
Treatment group 
-0.02 -0.01  -0.61** -0.47*  
(0.19) (0.26)  (0.25) (0.28)  
After-treatment period 
-0.22** -0.04 -0.08 0.24 0.11 -0.11 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.18) (0.11) (0.11) 
Treatment group* 
After-treatment period 
-0.65*** -0.49** -0.30 -0.47 -0.44 -0.59** 
(0.23) (0.25) (0.19) (0.33) (0.32) (0.27) 
Years since first publication 
 -0.02   -0.02  
 (0.04)   (0.04)  
Years since first publication2/100 
 0.03   0.02  
 (0.06)   (0.08)  
Pre-sample aggregate citations per 
publication average/10 
 0.12***     
 (0.04)     
Pre-sample publications average 
    0.27***  
    (0.04)  
Ln(number of publications) 
  0.96***    
  (0.10)    
Intercept 
3.59*** 3.63***  2.29*** 0.73  
(0.07) (0.54)  (0.64) (0.53)  
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Case effects YES YES NO YES YES NO 
Individual fixed effect NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Number of observations 255 255 253 331 331 331 
Notes: Poisson estimation of yearly aggregate citation counts of misconducting authors (columns 1-3) and annual citation output 
(columns 4-6). Aggregate citation count estimates offset by publications in year by including ln(number of publications) with 
coefficient fixed at 1 (QML F.E: not fixed). Prior author-years without publications not included in citation estimates sample. Years 
since first publication² and pre-sample aggregate citations per publication average scaled down for readability. Cluster-robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance level of coefficient: *: p<0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p< 0.01 
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6.4.3. Robustness Checks 
6.4.3.1. Robustness Check I: Exiting misconducting authors as a driver of 
the citation drop 
As a first robustness check, we explore the possibility that part of the drop in aggregate 
citations might be caused by the fact that misconducting authors leave the scientific 
community (Redman and Merz, 2008). The results presented in the previous section indicated 
that misconducting authors publish significantly less after the misconduct case surfaces. Since 
the likelihood to cite a prior collaborator might be disproportionately high, the drop of 
misconducting authors can be an alternative explanation for the patterns observed.  
Whereas our dataset does not allow us to assess the origin of every individual citation, we 
perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation as a robustness check. We first estimate a 
publication trend for each misconducting author, based on pre-treatment observations, as a 
proxy of the counterfactual publication pattern had the author not been caught committing 
scientific misconduct. We then make the most conservative assumption that all of these 
publications (observed in the pre-treatment and estimated counterfactual situation in the post-
treatment period) cite all prior publications of the collaborators. We then subtract this 
maximum amount of potential citations that the collaborator could have received from the 
misconducting scientist from the dependent variable and re-run our regressions.13 If the 
citation drop would be caused by the misconducting author leaving academia our previously 
found treatment effect should disappear. 
The results, shown in column 1 of table 5, however, display that the treatment effect is still 
significant and negative. This exercise should be seen as an upper limit estimate of the 
potential citation relation between misconducting author and prior collaborator, it indicates 
that the effect is not driven by the misconducting author dropping out of scientific publishing. 
                                                          
13 Due to the fact that we use estimated citations for the counterfactual situation it can happen that the aggregate 
citations minus the estimated value turn negative. In this case we set them to 0. 
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Table 7: Robustness checks: excluding citations by misconducting authors 
 
Dependent: Prior collaborator’s 
aggregate citations 
(1) (2) (3) 
Model Baseline 
Incl.  
Controls 
QML 
FE 
Treatment group 
0.33*** 0.39***  
(0.07) (0.07)  
After-treatment period 
0.24*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Treatment group* 
After-treatment period 
-0.24*** -0.25*** -0.27*** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Years since first publication 
 0.02**  
 (0.01)  
Years since first publication2/100 
 -0.03*  
 (0.02)  
Pre-sample citations per publication average/10 
 0.03***  
 (0.004)  
Intercept 
3.14*** 2.88*** 0.88*** 
(0.60) (0.61) (0.03) 
Year effects YES YES YES 
Case effects YES YES NO 
Individual fixed effect NO NO YES 
Number of observations 10756 10756 10144 
Notes: Poisson estimation of yearly aggregate citation counts, excluding citations by misconducting 
authors. Citations by misconducting authors have been estimated post-treatment by extrapolating pre-
treatment trend and assuming that every publication by misconducting author cites entire body of 
prior collaborator’s work at that time. Aggregate citation count estimates offset by publications in 
year by including ln(number of publications) with coefficient fixed at 1. Prior collaborator-years 
without publications not included in sample. Years since first publication² and pre-sample citations 
per publication scaled down for readability. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars 
indicate significance level of coefficient: *: p<0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p< 0.01 
 
6.4.3.2. Robustness Check II: Citation flows 
We acknowledge the fact that a drop of aggregate citations does not necessarily coincide with 
a drop in the citation flow. Hence, we replicate the regressions for aggregate citations reported 
above for the citation flow in Table 8. We take a three-year fixed overlapping citation window 
(Rehn et al., 2014, p. 19) and offset for the volume of publications that might be cited through 
the number of articles published in the same time window. As Scopus only offers detailed 
information on citation flows from 1996 onwards (Rehn et al., 2014 p. 16) we restrict the 
estimation sample to this period. We do not include a pre-sample mean estimator in these 
models as it imposes a particularly strong constraint on the sample, and instead focus on the 
QML F.E. Poisson model to control for unobserved heterogeneity. While the models without 
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controls or offset (Table 8, column 1), with offset but without controls (column 2), or with 
offset and controls (column 3) show little effect, the results from a QML F.E. Poisson 
regression shows an estimated drop of 9% in citation flow after publication of the Findings 
(column 4), which is statistically significant at p<0.05. The difference between the QML F.E. 
specification and the others highlights the importance of controlling for unobserved 
individual-specific effects in this specification.  
Table 8: Robustness checks: Citation flow 
 
Dependent: Prior collaborator’s citation flow (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model Baseline Offset Controls 
QML 
F.E. 
Treatment group 
0.09 -0.06 -0.06  
(0.10) (0.07) (0.07)  
After-treatment period 
-0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Treatment group* 
After-treatment period 
0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09** 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Years since first publication 
  0.01  
  (0.01)  
Years since first publication2/100 
  -0.02  
  (0.02)  
Ln(Publication stock) 
   1.00*** 
   (0.04) 
Intercept 
3.74*** 1.24*** 1.12***  
(0.59) (0.31) (0.32)  
Year effects YES YES YES YES 
Case effects YES YES YES NO 
Individual fixed effect NO NO NO YES 
Number of observations 10235 9731 9731 9479 
Notes: Poisson estimate of prior collaborator’s yearly citation flow. Citation flow calculated in a three 
year citation window. Publication Stock: number of articles published in same window. Model 2-3: 
estimates offset by ln(Publication Stock) with coefficient fixed at 1. Model 4: ln(Publication Stock) 
included as control without restriction. Model 2-4: author-years with 0 publication stock not included. 
Years since first publication² scaled down for readability. Cluster-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Stars indicate significance level of coefficient: *: p<0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p< 0.01 
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6.4.3.3. Effect heterogeneity: author reputation and scandal size 
Finally, we explore two sources of potential heterogeneity in the effects documented 
above. We consider the standing of the prior collaborators before the misconduct case 
surfaces and the scope of the scandal. One could expect that scientists with a better standing 
are more affected by stigmatization and that also a scandal with a broader scope would have 
more significant negative effects. On the other hand, previous work has shown that the most  
eminent authors seem to be able to mostly avoid the fallout associated with retractions, 
whereas less eminent author suffer disproportionally (Jin et al., 2013) 
Starting with the standing of scientists, we estimated differential effects by the citation 
stock of either the misconducting author or the prior collaborator, along their location in the 
citation stock distribution of the sample in the year before treatment. Citations proxy the 
standing or the visibility of the scientist within the academic community. The results are 
shown in Figure 2, for heterogeneity along the misconducting author’s pre-treatment citation 
stock, and in Figure 3 for that of prior collaborators. The regression output can be found in 
table A.1. As Figure 2 shows, the negative effects shown above are driven by the bottom half 
of the misconducting authors’ citation distribution. For the third and fourth quartile, the point 
estimates turn positive but statistically nonsignificant at p < 0.05. In other words, 
stigmatization of prior collaborators seems to occur mainly when the misconducting author 
has (comparatively) low reputation himself.  
Figure 3 plots the results when differentiating by the prior citation stock of the prior 
collaborator herself. Here too, the results show that the effects are strongest for authors in the 
lower quartile, who experience a 34% drop in citations (p<0.01). The second quartile is 
estimated at a drop of 20% (p<0.01). For the third quartile the effect is estimated at 11% 
(p<0.10), and the fourth quartile shows no significant drop at p<0.10. These results confirm 
the “reverse Matthew effect” documented previously by Jin et al. (2013) also for prior 
33 
 
collaborators. The main effects thus seem to be strongly moderated by, on the one hand, the 
prior reputation of the misconducting author, and, on the other, the prior reputation of the 
potential stigmatization victim. This is in line with the interpretation of the results presented 
here as social stigmatization: especially those prior collaborators who lack a well-established 
reputation suffer from the stereotyping inherent to stigmatization by mere association. The 
effects are at their worst when both are on the left tail of the distribution. 
Figure 2: Treatment effect on prior collaborator by pre-treatment citation quartile of 
misconducting author 
 
Note: This figure represents a plot of coefficients stemming from a Poisson model where prior collaborator’s 
aggregate citations are regressed onto year and case effects, years since first publication in linear and squared 
terms, pre-sample aggregate citations per publication average, and an exposure term capturing publication output 
in the year. The plot shows the treatment effect interacted with 4 quartile indicators of misconducting author’s pre-
treatment citation stock. Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Incidence Rate Ratios. Confidence bands 
represent 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on robust standard errors clustered by misconduct case. Full 
regression output is presented in table A.1 
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Figure 3: Treatment effect on prior collaborator by pre-treatment citation quartile of 
prior collaborator 
 
Notes: This figure represents a plot of coefficient estimates stemming from Poisson model where prior 
collaborator’s aggregate citations is regressed onto year and case effects, years since first publication in linear and 
squared terms, pre-sample aggregate citations per publication average , and an exposure term capturing publication 
output in the year. The plot shows the treatment effect interacted with 4 quartile indicators of prior collaborator’s 
pre-treatment citation stock. Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Incidence Rate Ratios. Confidence bands 
represent 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on robust standard errors clustered by misconduct case. Full 
regression output is presented in table A.1 
In a second set of estimations we compare the effects across the scope of the scandal. 
Ceteris paribus, it is reasonable to expect a stronger impact on reputation of a larger 
misconduct scandal. To conceptualize the scope of a scandal, we make use of the number of 
papers corrected or retracted, the number of citations received by papers which were corrected 
in the wake of the scandal, and the highest impact factor associated with a paper which was 
corrected or retracted in the wake of the scandal. One to ten papers were affected by the 
misconduct cases included in the study.14 
Figures 4 through 6 show the results of estimations differentiating between different 
scopes of the scandal. The full results are presented in table A.2. Along all three measures, we 
cannot detect a substantial trend in effect size along the scope of the scandal. This result might 
                                                          
14 The median case involved the retraction or correction of 2 articles. Approximately 75% of the articles affected 
were retracted, the others corrected. The results presented in this section are similar when differentiating between 
retracted and corrected articles.  
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be explained by the fact that our analysis is based on a positive selection in terms of scandal 
scope since all our cases have been formally investigated and found guilty by the ORI, which  
in all but a few cases in the sample led to exclusion from highly prestigious NIH grant 
funding. There might be a stronger link between scandal scope and consequences (for prior 
collaborators) among the broader range of misconduct cases outside of the ORI. 
Figure 4: Treatment effect on prior collaborator by size of scandal number of articles 
affected 
 
Note: This figure represents a plot of coefficients stemming from a Poisson model where prior collaborator’s 
aggregate citations are regressed onto year and case effects, years since first publication in linear and squared 
terms, pre-sample aggregate citations per publication average, and an exposure term capturing publication output 
in the year. The plot shows the treatment effect interacted with 4 groups of the number of articles retracted or 
corrected in the wake of the scandal. Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Incidence Rate Ratios. 
Confidence bands represent 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on robust standard errors clustered by 
misconduct case. Full regression output is presented in table A.2 
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Figure 5: Treatment effect on prior collaborator by size of scandal: total citation impact 
 
Note: This figure represents a plot of coefficients stemming from a Poisson model where prior collaborator’s 
aggregate citations are regressed onto year and case effects, years since first publication in linear and squared 
terms, pre-sample aggregate citations per publication average, and an exposure term capturing publication output 
in the year. The plot shows the treatment effect interacted with 4 quartile indicators of the importance of the 
affected work, as measured through the total number of citations received by the work. Coefficients are 
exponentiated and represent Incidence Rate Ratios. Confidence bands represent 95% confidence intervals, 
calculated based on robust standard errors clustered by misconduct case. Full regression output is presented in 
table A.2 
Figure 6: Treatment effect on prior collaborator by size of scandal: highest impact 
factor 
 
Note: This figure represents a plot of coefficient estimates stemming from a Poisson model where prior 
collaborator’s aggregate citations are regressed onto year and case effects, years since first publication in linear 
and squared terms, pre-sample aggregate citations per publication average, and an exposure term capturing 
publication output in the year. The plot shows the treatment effect interacted with 4 quartile indicators of 
importance of the affected work, as measured through the highest impact factor among the articles retracted or 
corrected in the wake of the misconduct scandal. Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Incidence Rate 
Ratios. Confidence bands represent 95% confidence intervals, calculated based on robust standard errors clustered 
by misconduct case. Full regression output is presented in table A.2 
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7. Conclusions and discussion 
The fact that we can detect the impact of misconduct in prior collaborators suggests that 
scientific misconduct affects many more than previously imagined. By documenting negative 
consequences of scientific misconduct for innocent prior collaborators, our results show that 
the implications of scientific misconduct spread beyond the fraudulent researcher, suggesting 
that articles by prior collaborators are less often used as building blocks for future research. 
This is an unwarranted and wasteful disregard of valid research findings, which slows down 
scientific progress and represents a cost to society. These findings are consistent with the theory 
of stigmatization through mere association (Goffman, 1963; Goldstein and Johnson, 1997; 
Mehta and Farina, 1988; Pontikes et al., 2010).  
Why would stigmatization through mere association happen in the scientific setting? 
The answer, in our opinion, lies in the reliance on trust in the scientific enterprise. While 
misconduct should in principle be detected during the peer review process or through scrutiny 
by readers, it is prohibitively costly – in terms of money and time - to verify some results to a 
sufficient degree, and scientists need to a certain extent assume honesty of their peers (Dewald 
et al., 1986). At the same time, scientific research is becoming ever more complex and 
multidisciplinary so that scientists need to rely more on the expertise of their collaborators 
(Jones, 2009; Wuchty et al., 2007). Not in the least, researchers do not have strong incentives 
to perform replication studies, as they receive relatively little attention and are unlikely to 
change thinking (Hamermesh, 2007). Yet these studies are important. One recent replication 
study reported that of 100 replication attempts in psychology, only 39 were successful (Baker, 
2015). Another study found that 47 out of 53 ‘landmark’ studies in cancer research could not 
be replicated (Begley and Ellis, 2012). Given that scientists need to assume the honesty of their 
colleagues and are hard pressed for testing it, it should come as no surprise that they fall back 
on heuristics and stereotyping for appraising the reliability of their colleagues.  
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Whereas some evidence exists that those accused but not found guilty of misconduct 
can at least mend their reputation through exoneration (Greitemeyer and Sagioglou, 2015), there 
seem to be no clear course of action for dealing with the indirect reputational effects 
documented here. The problem becomes even clearer when one notes that in this setup, 
misconducting scientists were clearly named, and the nature of their misdoings was 
transparently reported. Other, less transparent contexts might lead to even worse effects for 
prior collaborators.  
Since means to counteract stigma at the institutional level are limited, we turn to options 
that the stigmatized collaborator themselves might have. Psychiatric research discusses three 
ways of responding to stigma:15 protest, education, and contact (Corrigan and Watson, 2002). 
Evidence suggests those who know more about the “disease” – in our context the association 
of misconduct – tend to stigmatize less than others (Corrigan and Penn, 1999). Contact with 
stigmatized persons also reduces stigmatization (Kolodziej and Johnson, 1996). In the present 
context, this means that prior collaborators of colleagues found guilty of scientific misconduct 
should actively take part in the scientific community. Attempting to suppress the stigma can 
however also worsen stigmatization (Monteith et al., 1998).  
Given these findings, we believe that it is important to create awareness within the 
scientific community about guilt by association. Stigmatized scientists may for instance 
proactively use scientific conferences as a forum to discuss their case with the scientific 
community. This is in line with the psychiatric recommendation to “transform the person from 
a patient to an advocate” (e.g. Byrne, 2000). Such efforts could also be supported by scientific 
journals by providing a forum for innocent scientists with indirect ties to misconducting 
colleagues. At least in case of stigma related to mental disease, education campaigns have been 
proven to be successful (Wolff et al., 1996). 
                                                          
15 This research is mostly concerned with stigmatization associated with mental disease. 
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One alarming implication of our findings is that scientists might refrain from 
whistleblowing on their colleagues if they know to expect a backlash through association. Such 
behaviour would stand in sharp contrast to the self-correction function that science relies on. A 
survey or 68 whistle-blowers at the ORI (Lubalin and Matheson, 1999) supports that a majority 
of whistle-blowers experiences negative outcomes of their whistleblowing, affecting their 
career advancement, professional activities, mental health and personal life. The question arises 
whether self-correction suffices as a mechanism to ensure validity of research results; or 
whether in times of increased pressure on scientists to publish paired with unpreceded levels of 
complexity and multidisciplinarity of research call for different quality control mechanisms. 
Some have proposed that stigmatization might serve a function as a deterring factor for future 
misconduct. However, the effectiveness of stigma for deterrence is debated in the broader 
criminal setting (Funk, 2004; Harel and Klement, 2007; Rasmusen, 1996), with some evidence 
indicating that, while inducing deterrence effects for non-offenders, stigmatization increases 
the crime rate for offenders (Funk, 2004). In our setting, stigmatization might make future 
misconduct more attractive by reducing its costs for the already stigmatized innocent 
collaborators. In this sense, modelling the effect of stigmatization and stigma by association 
and scientific misconduct, might make for an interesting avenue for future theoretical research. 
Our study makes several contributions to the small, but developing literature on the 
consequences of scientific misconduct. First of all, we contribute to prior studies providing 
possible explanations for citation penalties for scientists around the misconducting scientist 
himself. Mechanisms proposed previously include the Bayesian updating of beliefs (Azoulay 
et al., 2014a; Jin et al. 2013), a loss of trust (Lu et al, 2012) and the ambition to protect the own 
scientific integrity (Azoulay et al., 2014a). We introduce the concept of social stigmatization 
which we borrowed from sociology as an overarching concept to explain the three mechanisms. 
Caused by a loss of trust, social stigmatization can be the reason for an Bayesian updating of 
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beliefs about the “quality” of prior collaborators and the way for the members of the scientific 
community too protect the own scientific integrity. 
Second, we show that the ripple effect of scientific misconduct reaches further than the 
fraudulent author’s close collaborators or colleagues. Given the significance of the citation 
penalty that these distantly related scientists experience and the increasing trend of 
collaboration in science, our results show that the costs of scientific misconduct have been 
underestimated so far. This seems to be especially the case for scholars who have not developed 
a strong reputation for themselves yet, as these seem to be hit particularly hard by stigmatization 
through mere association. 
Third, we present the first study to analyse a clean sample of scientific misconduct cases 
in this context. Prior studies often focus on retraction which are readily available from 
publication databases such as the Web of Science or Scopus and include scientific misconduct 
cases along with retractions due to honest mistakes (Azoulay et al., 2012, 2104a). The 
difference in magnitude of the effects on misconduct authors (robustness check 2) that we 
present as compared to prior studies should remind us of the important difference between both. 
From a more general perspective, our result is related to research about ‘superstar 
extinction’ in that it confirms that shocks to coauthorship networks seem to ripple out (Azoulay 
et al., 2014b, 2010). Our results can also be interpreted as an extreme case of negative citations, 
which have been shown to prelude a future decline in citations (Catalini et al., 2015). 
Our study is not free of limitations. The downside of using a clean sample of misconduct 
cases for quantitative analysis is a smaller number of cases. In our context, where we are 
interested in the effects of misconduct on prior collaborators this however is of minor 
importance because of the large number of collaborators NIH grant recipients have. A more 
important point to stress is that the NIH grant recipients are a positive selection and might not 
have a lot in common with the average scientists. This implies that our results represent upper 
limit estimates and should be treated as such. An interesting avenue for follow-up studies could 
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be to employ network methods for a network of co-authors in order to investigate how far the 
effect of scientific misconduct reaches.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Poisson regression estimates of citations rates of misconducting authors 
interacted with prior citation stock of misconducting author or prior collaborator  
Dependent:  Prior collaborators’ aggregate citations  (1) (2) 
Model By prior citation 
stock 
of misconducting 
authors 
By prior citation stock 
of collaborator 
Treatment group 
-0.02 -0.03 
(0.05) (0.05) 
After-treatment period 
0.09** 0.10*** 
(0.04) (0.04) 
Treatment group* 
After-treatment period* 
quartile 1 
-0.11** -0.42*** 
(0.06) (0.10) 
Treatment group * 
After-treatment period* 
quartile 2 
-0.16*** -0.22*** 
(0.05) (0.08) 
Treatment group * 
After-treatment period* 
quartile 3 
0.02 -0.12* 
(0.09) (0.07) 
Treatment group * 
After-treatment period* 
quartile 4 
0.05 -0.02 
(0.08) (0.04) 
Years since first publication 
0.02*** 0.02*** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Years since first publication2/100 
-0.03** -0.03** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Pre-sample citations per publication/10 
0.03*** 0.03*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Intercept 
3.71*** 3.76*** 
(0.37) (0.36) 
Year effects YES YES 
Case effects YES YES 
Individual fixed effect NO NO 
Number of observations 10756 10756 
Notes: Poisson estimation of prior collaborator’s aggregate citations. Aggregate citation count in year offset 
by publications in year by including ln(number of publications) with coefficient fixed at 1. Quartile indicates 
quartile of citation stock at t-1 of respectively misconducting author and prior collaborator. Author-years 
without publications not included in citation estimates sample. Years since first publication² and pre-sample 
citations per publication scaled down for readability. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.  Stars 
indicate significance level of coefficient: *: p<0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p< 0.01 
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Table A.2: Poisson regression estimates of citations rates of misconducting authors 
interacted with prior citation stock of misconducting author or prior collaborator  
Dependent:  Prior Collaborator’s 
aggregate citations  
(1) (2) (3) 
Model Number of 
publications 
affected 
Citation-weighed 
affected 
publications 
Highest IF of 
affected papers 
Treatment group 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
After-treatment period 
0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Treatment group* 
After-treatment period* 
quartile 1 
-0.10** -0.21*** -0.08 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) 
Treatment group * 
After-treatment period* 
quartile 2 
-0.10* -0.04 -0.07 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Treatment group * 
After-treatment period* 
quartile 3 
0.03 -0.10 -0.11** 
(0.09) (0.06) (0.06) 
Treatment group * 
After-treatment period* 
quartile 4 
-0.11 -0.05 -0.08 
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07) 
Years since first publication 
0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Years since first publication2/100 
-0.03*** -0.03** -0.03** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Pre-sample citations per publication 
average/10 
0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Intercept 
3.67*** 3.69*** 3.72*** 
(0.35) (0.36) (0.37) 
Year effects YES YES YES 
Case effects YES YES YES 
Individual fixed effect NO NO NO 
Number of observations 10756 10756 10756 
Notes: Poisson estimation of prior collaborator’s aggregate citations. Aggregate citation count in year offset 
by publication counts by including ln(number of publications) with coefficient fixed at one in the model. 
Column 1: quartile represents number of publications corrected or retracted in the misconduct case (1: 1 
publication affected or corrected, 2: 2-3, 3: 3-5, 4: 5+). Column 2: quartile represents quartile of citation-
weighted corrected or retracted publications in the misconduct case. Column 3: quartile represents quartile of 
highest impact factor among publications corrected or retracted in the context of the misconduct case. Author-
years without publications not included. Years since first publication² and pre-sample citations per publication 
scaled down for readability.  Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance level of 
coefficient: *: p<0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p< 0.01 
 
